Abstract: JackendofT's "mentalistic" semantics looks more radical [han it is. It can best be understood as a necessary corrective to the traditional oversimplification that holds that psychological variation «cancels out" on the path from word to world. This reform parallels the Neva-cleva" reform in evolutionary biology.
Abstract: JackendofT's "mentalistic" semantics looks more radical [han it is. It can best be understood as a necessary corrective to the traditional oversimplification that holds that psychological variation «cancels out" on the path from word to world. This reform parallels the Neva-cleva" reform in evolutionary biology.
!\,fendeJ's genes were a brilliant simpliBcation that pmmitted many ofthe fimdarnental principles and constraints ofinhelitance to be clearly described and tested. But if you took them too literally, imagining theln to have exact counterparts lined up like simple beads strung on the chromosomes, you got "beanbag genetics,'" as Emst Mayr once dismissively called it. The I.vorking parts of the DNA inheritance machinery encountered in contemporary molecular genetics are so much more subtle and active than rviendelian genes, that some would declare that genes -the genes Mendel introduced to us -do not e:dst at all! Eliminative m(J;terlalism regarding genes in ihe Age of Genes? An unlikely terminological refortn. vVe don't throwthe Mendelian ladder away; we continue to use it, \vith due circumspection and allowances (Crow 2001; Haldane 1964 ).
Jackendoff's masterpiece Foundations of Language (Jackendoff 20(2) poses a countelpart question: Isn't it time to trade in Chomsky's pathfInding syntactocentric vision for something more complex in some ways and more natural in others? In the syntactocentric picture, a word is a simple, inert sort of thing, a sound plus a meaning sitting in its pigeonhole in the lexicon waiting to be attached to a twig on a syntactic tree . .In Jackendoffs altemative vision, words are active: "little interface niles" (target article, sect. 9.3, para. 6) with lots of attachment prospects, links, constraints, affinities, and so on, carrying many of their combinator--ial powers with them. Jackendoff's proposed parallel architecture, v.iih its three simultaneous and semi--autonomous generative processes, is biologically plausible, both neuroscientifIcally and evolutionarily It opens up a space for theory modeling in which hypotheses about opponent processes, recurrence, and other sorts of mutual interaction, can be formulated and tested. The l'niversal Grammar (LTG) doesn't need to bewriHen down as rules to be consulted. It is partly embodied in the architecture, and partly fixed by culturally evolved attractors homed--in on by individual learning. The epicycles of syntactocentric theories largely evaporate, as the division of labor between syntax, semantics, and phonology gets re-allotted.
Any revolution is apt to look more outrageous in prospect than it tums out to be in retrospect. I would like to propose a friendly amendment, softening the blow of Jackendoffs "mentalistic" sernantics. Sernantics, as traditionally conceived by logicians, philosophers, and linguists, is where the rubber meets the road, where language gets all the way to the world and words refer to the things and events therein. The \vinding path by which a word "gets to" ihe wodd, when it does, surely lies in the mind (or brain) of a language user, but tradition has it that this messy intennediary can and should be largely ignored. There are several influential bad arguments as to \vhythis should be so, but here's one that can stand forthem all:
"M-y uncle is suing his stockbroker." VV'hen you hear that sentence; and understa~d it, you perhaps engage' in some imagery, picturing an adult male (in a suit?) with some papers in his hand, confronting, somehow, some other man (why a man?), and so on. There \vould no doubt be \:vide variation in the imagery in ihe minds of different hearers, and some might claim that they engaged in no imaging at all and yet still understood the sentence just fIne. !\,foreover, such imagery as people did indulge in would be unable on its own to fix the rneaning of the sentence (there is nothing an uncle looks like that distinguishes him from a father or brother), Clearly, goes the argument, the idiosyncrasies ofimagelJ or other mental processes we each indulge in are irrelevant to the issue of semantics -the \>;lord-world relation that speciHes, somehO\v, the set of objects in the \vorld correctl? referred to by "uncle," "sue," and "stockbroker." So, we cancel out all the conflicting and irrelevant mental states and processes and leave the mess)" minds out of semantics altogether. In any case, since we semanticists have to get all the \vay to the \'\Todd in the end, it won't do to stop short in the mind (or the brain), so why tarry? This is strikingly like the justiflcation that has been offered by evolutionists for habitually ignoring developmental biology: vVe choose to go from the gene directly to the adaptation, the phenotypic structure or behavior that is actually selected for, because that is, in evolution, where the lllbber rneets the road, A gene for x, a gene for y, and we can postpone indeBnitely the tJicky job of charting the Vi,inding path from gene transcription to operational phenotypic asset. This is in fact a very valuable simpliBcation, but it can be overdone. Reacting against it -todays "evo-devo" bandwagon ---can overshoot, too.
Jackendoff says, in italics, "it is necessary to thoroughly psychologizenotjust language, but also 'the world'" (p. 294) and adds: "the perrxrptual world is reality f-n us" (p. 308), As he recognizes, this looks as if he's stopping semantics in the brain, saddling his brilliant view oflanguage with some weird SOtt of materialistic idealism. Let me try to put the matter more mundanely. Most people go through life without ever giving semantics any thought. You don't have to Bgure out the semantics of your oV;'lllanguage to use it, but if you do try to, you soon discover the set of issues that exercise J ackendoff. It helps keep the quandaries at ba~' to go hetero-, to dothe semantics of some otberguy's language (and mind).
Like this:
The words of his language refer to things. We mustn't presuppose that his sernantic system matches ours -the meta-language we use to describe his psychology. If we \vant to say what his words refer to, we have to see how his brain is designed by evolution (including cultural evolution) and byindividualleaming, to parse out his perceptual and conceptual world. Once we've done this we can ask: Do his terms refer to things in the world as we parse it, or "just" to things in the \A1orld as he experiences it (and as his conspeciBcs and companions experience it)? (For if there is a language, there is a shared system even if it isn't our shared system.;
If the fanner is true, then we share the world \vith him; our manifest irnage (Sellars 1963) is (roughly) the same as his, and theirs.
If not, then \ve have to maintain something like scare--quotes when we refer to the "things" in his world. But either way, we eventually get all the way out to the world --where the rubber meets the road. \Vhat we can't express in our tem1s, we can describe in our tenns, Jackendoff insists, -nghtlyin my opinion, that it is on ly by taking this indirect path that analyzes the manifest image implicit in the language-users' brains that we can complete the task oflinguistics. For most purposes, however, we can continue using the traditional semantical talk about the word--world relation, just as biologists can continue to talk about genes for myopia or even dyslexia (Dawkins 1982; Dennett 1995), because we know how to take the longer, more complicated path when necessary.
